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DOES THE SUPREME COURT MATTER?
CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE INHERENT
POLITICIZATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW
Matthew
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Lassiter*

COURT AND THE
By Michael ]. Klarman. New
York: Oxford University Press. 2004. Pp. xii, 655. $35.
TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME

STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY.

I.

BACKGROUND

More than a decade ago, in a colloquium sponsored by the Virginia
Law Review,1 scholars of the civil rights movement launched a fierce
assault on Michael J. Klarman's2 interpretation of the significance of
the Supreme Court's famous school desegregation ruling in Brown v.
Board of Education.3 Klarman's "backlash thesis," initially set forth in
a series of law review and history journal articles and now serving as
the centerpiece of his new book, revolves around two central claims.
First, he argues that the advancements toward racial equality generally
attributed to Brown were instead the inevitable products of long-term
political, social, and economic transformations that "would have
undermined Jim Crow regardless of Supreme Court intervention."4
Second, he credits Brown with a role in this historical process only
through a chain of indirect causation: the Supreme Court decision
galvanized massive resistance and racial violence in the South, which
civil rights activists capitalized upon by engineering televised
confrontations that mobilized public opinion across the nation, which
created the climate for the passage of the federal civil rights and
voting rights legislation of the mid-1960s, which directly and

* Assistant Professor of History, University of Michigan. B.A. 1992, Furman; M.A.
(History) 1994, Ph.D. (History) 1999, University of Virginia.

1. Colloquium, Twentieth-Century Constitutional History, 80 VA. L. REV. 1 (1994).
2. James Monroe Professor of Law and Professor of History, University of Virginia.
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4. Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L.
REV. 7, 10 (1994).
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profoundly transformed southern race relations.5 Although the
contours of this general story are part of the standard historical
narrative, firmly grounded in the secondary source literature and
taught in almost every university classroom, Klarman's specific charge
that civil rights scholars have greatly exaggerated the importance of
Brown set off a bit of a firestorm. The first wave, which accompanied
the 1994 Virginia Law Review article, included not only the expected
differences of historiographical analysis but also criticism of a
surprisingly personal nature.
The response by David J. Garrow, titled Hopelessly Hollow
History, ascribed Klarman's views on Brown to the "professorial urge
for interpretive novelty," which often produces useful advancements
but in some unfortunate cases results in "revisionist interpretations
whose rhetorical excesses are quickly revealed for what they are when
old, but indisputable historical evidence, is inconveniently brought
back to the pictorial foreground."6 Garrow highlighted Klarman's
failure to acknowledge the "direct influence of Brown on the
instigation of the 1955 Montgomery [bus] boycott," a causal analysis
that emphasizes the crucial inspiration for southern black activists who
finally had the moral authority and legal force of the Supreme Court
on their side. 7 While conceding Klarman's point that Brown resulted
in little school desegregation during the decade after 1954, Garrow
blamed the Court itself for emboldening resistance to its decree
through the infamous "all deliberate speed" implementation
guidelines known as Brown //.8 Under this scenario, primary fault for
the limited reach of Brown rested in the justices' constrained vision of
enforcement rather than in their premature placement of
desegregation on the nation's political agenda. In the final sentence of
his rejoinder, Garrow dismissed Klarman's entire project with
undisguised condescension for the law professor treading on
historians' turf: "[C]ommentators would be well-advised to keep their
professional desire for interpretive novelty in check, for rhetorically
excessive overstatements and oversimplifications oftentimes do turn

5. Id.; see also Michael J. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash
Thesis, 81 J. AM. HIST. 81 (1994).
6. David J. Garrow, Hopelessly Hollow History: Revisionist Devaluing of Brown v.
Board of Education, 80 VA. L. REV. 151, 151 (1994). Garrow is the author of a respected
biography of Martin Luther King, Jr., and a massive history of Roe v. Wade, among other
works. See DAVID J. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE
SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (1986); DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY
AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE. V. WADE (1994).
7. Garrow, supra note 6, at 152.
8. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) [hereinafter Brown If]; Garrow, supra
note 6, at 158-59.
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out to be hopelessly hollow once a fuller understanding of the
historical record is brought to bear. "9
Mark Tushnet's critique, published in the same issue of the
Virginia Law Review, offered a different variation of Garrow's
indictment of careerist zealotry:
Lawyers are notorious for producing law-office history, the result of the
professional deformation in which judgment must be awarded to one or
the other side. Law-office history reduces complexity and contradiction
[tropes favored by academic historians] to simplicity and provides a story
in which all evidence points to a single conclusion.10

Tushnet contended that Klarman's backlash thesis underplayed the
historical magnitude of Brown when understood as a Supreme Court
proclamation of a "fundamental principle of constitutional law" that government policies designed to discriminate against black
citizens are illegitimate
a proposition with momentous
consequences that have extended far beyond the particular arena of
southern school desegregation.11 Turning to the details, Tushnet also
charged that Klarman's inevitability framework represented "a largely
determinist account of the transformation of race relations" and that
the emphasis on the chain reaction of white violence in the South and
white public opinion in the North "com[es] close to eliminating
African Americans as historical agents."12 He concluded with the
announcement that "[t]o the extent that Professor Klarman appears to
believe that he has established the unimportance of Brown [as a
declaration of constitutional principle] . . . and to believe that he has
deepened our understanding of the limits of judicial power, he is
mistaken."13
Klarman's rebuttal, subtitled Facts and Political Correctness, struck
back in kind. He began with the observation that "Brown v. Board of
Education is today so politically sacrosanct that one cannot
dispassionately discuss the decision's soundness as a matter of
constitutional theory."14 Although both Garrow and Tushnet had

9. Garrow, supra note 6, at 160.
10. Mark Tushnet, The Significance of Brown v. Board of Education, 80 VA. L. REV.
173, 173 (1994). Tushnet is the author of a number of books about the history of civil rights
litigation and jurisprudence. See MARK V. TuSHNET, THE NAACP'S LEGAL STRATEGY
AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (1987) [hereinafter TuSHNET, NAACP's
LEGAL STRATEGY]; see also MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD
MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961 (1994).
11. Tushnet, supra note 10, at 176.
12. Id. at 174, 179.
13. Id. at 184.
14. Michael J. Klarman, Brown v. Board of Education: Facts and Political Correctness,
80 VA. L. REV. 185, 185 (1994) (citations omitted).
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engaged Klarman almost exclusively on the immediate issues of
historical causation and the evidentiary basis for these claims, his
response quickly made it clear that a broader debate about the proper
"limits of judicial power" undergirded his inquiry into the impact of
Brown.15 The "political correctness" that circumscribed this academic
discussion "can only be lamented," Klarman continued, "as Brown
was not an unambiguously correct decision either for the justices or
the American public in 1954, and to formulate constitutional theories
on the basis of ahistorical judgments is at the very least
unconstructive, and possibly quite insidious."16 Klarman then
proceeded to marshal countervailing evidence against Garrow's claim
that Brown directly inspired the civil rights demonstrations that
followed, and he characterized Tushnet's accusation that the backlash
thesis denied historical agency to black southerners as "not only
inaccurate, but offensive."17 But Klarman emphasized that his critics
were battling him only on a secondary front, because "[t]he cultural or
symbolic account of Brown's significance has become . . . something of
a fallback position for those committed to preserving Brown's status
as a judicial icon while unable to identify concrete ways in which the
decision mattered. "1 8
This debate, which has been reinvigorated with the publication of
Klarman's lengthy and impressive book examining the Supreme Court
and racial discrimination from Plessy to Brown, is deeply contentious
in large part because its participants are starting from such different
vantage points.19 To oversimplify only slightly, most historians who
specialize in the fields of civil rights and African-American, southern,
and urban studies do indeed consider Brown to be "unambiguously
correct" and are not that bothered by law school anxieties about its
"soundness as a matter of constitutional theory."20 (The most salient
criticisms of Brown leveled by academic historians emanate from the
left end of the spectrum, from scholars who question the
assimilationist philosophy of the liberal integrationist agenda).21
15. Tushnet, supra note 10, at 184.
16. Klarman, supra note 14, at 185.
17. Id. at 198.
18. Id. at 186.
19. In a special issue sponsored by The Nation and dedicated to the fiftieth anniversary
of Brown, Klarman's interpretation of the relative insignificance of the 1954 decision placed
him decidedly in the minority among the civil rights scholars who contributed, although
almost every participant in the forum emphasized the nation's failure to achieve racial
equality in public education. Eric Foner & Randall Kennedy, Brown at 50, NATION, May 3,
2004, at 15.
20. Klarman, supra note 14, at 185.
21. See DARYL MICHAEL SCOTT, CONTEMPT AND PITY: SOCIAL POLICY AND THE
IMAGE OF THE DAMAGED BLACK PSYCHE, 1880-1996 (1997). Historians of the "post
integrationist" school also have been influenced by the critique of Brown associated with
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Historians generally measure Supreme Court decisions on a scale of
whether they advance or harm the struggle for social justice and racial
equality - meaning that there is an effective consensus within the
profession that Dred Scott, Plessy, and Korematsu were wrongly
decided, and a widely shared belief that the most important lesson of
Brown is how far the nation still has to go to live up to its promises.22
Many historians reflexively believe that judicial activism is necessary
to achieve liberal policy outcomes, a stance undoubtedly shaped by
the overall thrust of the Supreme Court decisions of the Warren era,
and they tend to be suspicious that theories of constitutional law
designed to limit judges from issuing countermajoritarian rulings are
animated by original-intent conservatism or some other undertaking
associated with the political right. In short, academic historians who
specialize in modem American society and politics effectively have
embraced a results-oriented rather than a process-oriented standard
for evaluating constitutional law, including a firm belief that judges
should expand and defend the rights of oppressed minorities and that
countermajoritarian decisions are often an essential component of this
mission.23
Klarman has been a vocal proponent of political process theory, an
approach to constitutional law that seeks to reconcile judicial review
with democracy "by demonstrating that judicial review consists of
something other than judges simply replacing legislative policy
judgments with their own."24 The "countermajoritarian problem,'' in
Klarman's view, can be resolved only through a constitutional theory
that limits judicial activism to those situations in which the outcome of
such intervention can be demonstrated to be more democratic than

Derrick A. Bell. See

DERRICK

A.

BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE

PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992); see also DERRICK A. BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN
V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM (2004).

22. See, e.g., Forum, Beyond Black, White, and Brown, NATION, May 3, 2004, at 17-24.
In recent years, a growing number of historians have moved beyond the widespread
interpretation of Brown as an unfulfilled promise in order to emphasize the inherent
limitations of the school desegregation decision as an expression of a particular strain of
postwar liberalism. From this view, Brown symbolizes a larger liberal project (understood in
contemporary terms as the "American Dilemma") that misdiagnosed the structural
foundations of white supremacy in its emphasis on eradicating individual racism and
obscured the national and multiracial scope of systematic discrimination against minorities
in its concentration on the regional and biracial context of Jim Crow. See also Kevin Gaines,
Round Table: Brown v. Board of Education, Fifty Years After: Whose Integration Was It? 91
J. AM. HIST. 19 (2004).
23. For a synthetic history that is representative of this results-oriented approach, see
(1998).

ERIC FONER, THE STORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM

24. Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77
747, 768 (1991).

REV.

VA. L.
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the legislative choices of elected representatives.25 In the early 1990s,
Klarman carved out an exception that justified Brown within the
political process framework, based on the argument that the nearly
universal disfranchisement 'of black southerners characterized Jim
Crow as an undemocratic system and the counterfactual (and
qualified) hypothesis that "effective enforcement of black voting
rights possibly would have rendered Brown unnecessary."26 He
concluded:
to

the

extent

disfranchisement,

that
it

Brown
cannot

does
be

not

justified

rest

on

under

southern
political

black
process

theory .... It is time we abandon the premise that Brown must have
been

correct

when

decided

(leaving

aside

the

widespread

disfranchisement of southern blacks) ... simply because in today's world
the result is so morally unimpeachable.27
To complicate the issue further, the other participant in the 1994
Virginia Law Review colloquium, Gerald N. Rosenberg, rebuked the
backlash thesis as a product of tortured reasoning that greatly
exaggerated the actual effect of Brown (the opposite charge of the
other critics), driven by Klarman's complicity in the mission to
preserve the decision's iconic status as a "symbol of the use of courts
to produce significant social reform," which "provides legitimacy and
a sense of purpose to liberal-leaning legal academics."28
And now, appearing on the fiftieth anniversary of Brown, Michael
Klarman's ambitious first book asks legal scholars and especially civil
rights historians to reconsider the question of how much the Supreme
Court really matters in American politics and society. Despite the
overheated rhetoric from some civil rights specialists in response to
Klarman's initial presentation of the backlash thesis, historians can
learn a lot from his analysis of various Supreme Court cases and his
warning against placing excessive faith in the judicial branch as a
vanguard of social change. The counterfactual and overly speculative
nature of the book's central thesis, however, probably will not
convince many partisans to abandon their celebration of the 1954
decision as a landmark in the struggle for racial equality. Klarman also
details at great length the broader historical developments that shaped
the trajectory of civil rights case law, a narrative that is comprehensive
and compelling but drawn primarily from the secondary source

25. Id.; see also Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional Fact/Constitutional Fiction: A
Critique of Bruce Ackerman's Theory of Constitutional Moments, 44 STAN. L. REV 759
(1992).
.

26. Klarman, supra note 24, at 807.
27. Id. at 815, 819.
28. Gerald N. Rosenberg, Brown Is Dead! Long Live Brown! The Endless Attempt To
Canonize a Case, SO VA. L. REV. 161, 171 (1994). Rosenberg is also the author of the book
THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).
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literature, and these sections may be of greater interest to legal
scholars seeking to understand the context surrounding judicial
decisions than to historians who may already be familiar with the
events. This hybrid book simultaneously presents a historical inquiry
into the effects of Brown alongside a theoretical analysis of the
political and social forces that govern judicial decisionmaking.
Klarman is almost certainly right that historians have overstated the
power and the inclination of the judicial branch to lead the nation
toward greater social justice, but he also remains vulnerable to the
admonition that history practiced by constitutional lawyers can flatten
into a teleological narrative "in which all evidence points to a single
conclusion." 29 From Jim Crow to Civil Rights offers a plausible though
debatable account of the direct and indirect consequences of Brown
during the decade after 1954, but the book's most notable weakness is
the failure to interrogate with any rigor the principal claim that the
1964 Civil Rights Act and not the federal courts played the definitive
role in dismantling Jim Crow in the public schools of the South during
the decade that followed.
II.

THEPLESSYERA

Although the relationship between Brown and racial change
represents the book's overarching theme, Klarman does not turn to
the 1954 decision until page 290 of the volume. The first third of From
Jim Crow to Civil Rights surveys the Court's most significant civil
rights rulings during the Plessy era of legal segregation; the middle
section portrays World War II as the genuine watershed for black
white race relations; and the final third explores the context of Brown
and the political backlash against school desegregation in the South.
Klarman begins by contrasting the regressive racial climate of the late
1890s with the progressive currents of the mid-1950s, and the
introduction sets forth a three-part agenda for the chapters that
follow: to recount the forces that underlaid the substantial racial
advancements that took place during this half-century; to investigate
the dynamics that produced key judicial rulings, including Plessy and
Brown; and to measure the extent to which the Supreme Court shaped
the broader political and social milieu of racial discrimination and civil
rights (p. 4). Klarman explains that the judicial decisionmaking
process operates simultaneously along a political and a legal axis,
although "because constitutional law is generally quite indeterminate,
constitutional interpretation almost inevitably reflects the broader
social and political context of the times" (p. 5). Such a perspective on

29. Tushnet, supra note 10, at 173.
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constitutional history suggests that "justices are unlikely to be either
heroes or villains . . . [because] they rarely hold views that deviate far
from dominant public opinion" (p. 6). This assessment means that the
Supreme Court essentially moved with the flow of national sentiment
when it invalidated de jure segregation in Brown, and also that the
justices merely sanctioned mainstream legal and political trends when
they originally sustained Jim Crow six decades earlier in Plessy, which
is where the story begins.
In the first chapter, Klarman presents a solid case that Plessy v.
Ferguson, widely viewed today as one of the Supreme Court's most
indefensible decisions, actually represented a reasonable outcome in
the political context of the time and indeed was never even a close
call.30 He argues that the civil rights decisions of the Plessy Court
(1895-1910) "reflected, far more than they created, the regressive
racial climate of the era" (p. 9). During the last two decades of the
nineteenth century, the end of Reconstruction accompanied a wave of
lynchings and political violence targeting black voters in the South,
northern public opinion and Republican party policy shifted decisively
against federal intervention to protect civil rights, the third-party
Populist movement's brief flirtation with biracial alliances galvanized
powerful Democratic appeals to racial unity, and imperialist
adventures abroad fostered a desire for sectional reconciliation
grounded in a transregional public culture of white supremacy (pp. 1015). As an antidote to pervasive racial violence, and in an effort to
stabilize the forces unleashed by industrialization and urbanization,
many leading figures in the South and the North viewed segregation
and disfranchisement as progressive methods of managing race
relations. For a number of historians, the "New South" project of
economic modernization through racial peace and stability holds the
key to understanding the advent of the Jim Crow system.31 Klarman
recognizes the links between Progressive reform and racial
segregation and disfranchisement but does not make this explanation
as central to his analysis as the aforementioned political factors.32 He

30. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
31. See, e.g., EDWARD L. AYERS, THE PROMISE OF THE NEW SOUTH: LIFE AFI'ER
RECONSTRUCDON (1992); PAUL M. GASTON, THE NEW SOUTH CREED: A STUDY IN
SOUTHERN MYTHMAKING (1970); GLENDA ELIZABETH GILMORE, GENDER AND JIM
CROW: WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF WHITE SUPREMACY IN NORTH CAROLINA, 18961920 (1996).
32. Pp. 21-22, 38. Progressive reformers in both the South and the North believed that
segregation and disfranchisement provided forward-looking resolutions to interracial
violence, a modernized version of scientifically managed race relations. Although Klarman
cites the relevant historical literature on this point, the Progressive version of the origins of
segregation moves somewhat at cross-purposes with his broader argument that the steady
deterioration of race relations and the regressive racial climate of the late 1800s culminated
in the political and judicial transitions of the Plessy era. See generally id.
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also contends, in a strained effort at disaggregation that serves to
minimize the legal foundations of Jim Crow, that the Plessy Court's
legitimation of the emerging framework of de jure segregation and
racially motivated disfranchisement did not make much difference
because "the oppression of blacks was largely the work of forces other
than law" (p. 10).
The major civil rights decisions issued by the Plessy Court involved
state-mandated segregation in transportation along with challenges to
ostensibly race-neutral public policies governing voting and jury
service clearly designed to further discrimination in their application.
Klarman argues that the Republican architects of the Fourteenth
Amendment might have believed they were banning segregation on
railroads but almost certainly did not intend to invalidate segregation
in public education (pp. 18-27). Although the Supreme Court during
this period never ruled directly on laws requiring school segregation,
the 1896 decision in Plessy upheld a Louisiana railroad statute that
mandated separate and equivalent facilities for black and white
passengers. The majority opinion distinguished between political and
social equality (p. 21), with only the former protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment, a verdict Klarman attributes to judicial
validation of the fact that racial segregation "simply mirrored the
preferences of most white Americans" (p. 22). He also points out that
Plessy (contrary to popular mythology) "did not hold that the
Constitution required racially separate facilities to be equal" and that
in subsequent rulings the justices made it clear that black public
schools and other segregated accommodations need only meet a
minimum standard of reasonableness rather than a strict standard of
equality (p. 46). Then, in the first of many counterfactual scenarios
employed throughout the book to emphasize the limited effect of
Supreme Court decisions, Klarman concludes that the federal
government would not and could not have enforced an alternative
judicial decision that invalidated segregation in the South (pp. 47-52).
Not that it would have mattered, however, because "there is no direct
evidence that Plessy led to an expansion of segregation" (p. 48) and
"more favorable Court rulings, even if enforceable, would not have
appreciably alleviated the oppression of southern blacks" (p. 60).
Does constitutional law then matter much at all? It is hard not to
conclude, given the bold and sweeping nature of these assertions and
the ambiguity and complexity of the evidence at hand, that Klarman
has constructed a teleological model of historical change in which
political and social forces always determine the outcome of judicial
processes but the cause-and-effect relationship almost never moves
appreciably in the opposite direction. The problem with this
framework is not only that the legal culture of white supremacy
represented one of the central pillars of the Jim Crow system that
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governed the South from the 1890s until the 1960s, and therefore that
both civil rights activists and defenders of racial segregation focused
on the public spaces under authority of the law as the critical sphere of
confrontation during the postwar struggle for racial equality.33 The
problem is also that, even during the Plessy era, the Supreme Court's
refusal to investigate the extralegal (e.g. "subconstitutional")
subterfuges employed to discriminate against blacks actively fortified
the emerging political culture of white supremacy in ways that
challenge Klarman's model of judicial minimalism. In the area of voter
disfranchisement, southern legislatures operated within the technical
confines of the Fifteenth Amendment, adopting suffrage restrictions
such as literacy tests that vested substantial administrative discretion
in local officials, obvious subterfuges designed to discriminate in
practice despite their statutory race neutrality. In Williams v.
Mississippi, the Court declined - despite sufficient precedent - to
scrutinize either the legislative motive or the state action that
undergirded the disfranchisement of black citizens (pp. 28-39).34 In the
area of jury service, the Court likewise articulated a legal principle of
racial nondiscrimination but "essentially invited nullification" (p. 55)
by refusing to investigate the administrative discretion that achieved
the systematic exclusion of blacks (pp. 39-43, 55-57).
Klarman largely substantiates his claim that the Plessy Court's civil
rights decisions represented "plausible interpretations of conventional
legal sources" and accurate reflections of white public opinion, and
therefore the corollary that "these rulings were not blatant
nullifications of post-Civil War constitutional amendments designed to
secure racial equality" (p. 9). But this does not necessarily confirm his
broader thesis about the minimal effect of the Plessy-era decisions on
the path of history. Klarman's belief in judicial minimalism downplays
the import of having the institution of the Supreme Court - and not
just southern vigilantes or political demagogues or even Progressive
era reformers - extend the federal government's stamp of
constitutional approval to a formal legal system that operated on the
basis of the systematic racial subordination of African Americans.

33. Klarman briefly remarks that "[e]ven if Plessy did not inspire the expansion of
segregation, it may have provided legitimacy to the practice and thus delayed its eventual
demise." P. 48. Most historians of the Jim Crow period and the civil rights movement would
dispense with the speculative verb choice and then consider this statement of possibility to
be demonstrably true. Leaving aside the debate about the immediate influence of Plessy,
Klarman's thesis of the minimal impact of Supreme Court decisions on society and politics
fails adequately to explore the issue of whether precedents such as Plessy imposed
substantial constraints on the struggle for racial equality several decades down the road,
projecting the constitutional law of one era into a substantially altered historical context.
The judicial reasoning in Plessy certainly shaped and constricted the litigation strategies of
the NAACP. See TuSHNET, NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY, supra note 10.
34. 170 U.S. 213 (1898).
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"Jim Crow legislation was generally more symbolic than functional,"
according to Klarman, because "[w)hite supremacy depended less on
law than on entrenched social mores, backed by economic power and
the threat and reality of violence" (p. 82). But surely it is not simply a
coincidence that a relatively stable racial order marked the four
decades between the turn of the twentieth century and the beginning
of World War II, the same era during which the Plessy Court's
validation of legal segregation and black disfranchisement remained
operative. Nor is it incidental that substantial black activism and
corresponding white violence marked the fluid and unsettled racial
climate that existed during the decades before the Supreme Court's
endorsement of segregation and disfranchisement in the late 1890s,
and also during the period after the federal judiciary began to chip
away at both policies beginning in the 1940s.35
The Supreme Court's overt willingness to tolerate state-action
subterfuges that enforced anti-black discrimination through race
neutral facades also helped to shape the legal underpinnings of racial
inequality and provided a segregationist road map for southern (and
northern) policymakers throughout the twentieth century. Between
1910 and 1920, the Court issued a series of rulings that invalidated
forced peonage laws, grandfather clauses, separate-and-unequal
luxury accommodations in railroad cars, and city ordinances
mandating residential segregation.36 These cases, which Klarman aptly
characterizes as "concerned more with form than substance," were
therefore "easy to circumvent" as long as legislatures continued to pay
lip service to constitutional principles (p. 62). For example, beginning
in the 1920s the NAACP mounted an aggressive assault on residential
segregation, which emerged as a decidedly national phenomenon as a
result of urbanization in the South and the First Great Migration of
blacks to the North. But the federal courts upheld restrictive racial
covenants under the doctrine of private property rights until the late
1940s, and they have never seriously challenged "racially motivated
but facially neutral zoning" (p. 92) and other public policies that offer
ample evidence of state action.37 In the area of criminal law, the
35. Stability and fluidity are relative concepts, and I do not mean to suggest a calcified
racial order between 1900 and 1940. For two differing interpretations of this period, see
NEIL R. MCMILLEN, DARK JOURNEY: BLACK MISSISSIPPIANS IN THE AGE OF JIM CROW
(1989); J. DOUGLAS SMITH, MANAGING WHITE SUPREMACY: RACE, POLITICS, AND
CITIZENSHIP IN JIM CROW VIRGINIA (2002).
36. Pp. 61-97. The only one of these decisions that might seem to be a substantive step
forward, the invalidation of a Louisville residential segregation ordinance, pivoted on a
defense of property rights more than racial equality and did not noticeably alter housing
patterns. S ee p. 82; Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
37. Pp. 142-46. Historians and social scientists have emphasized the centrality of state
action through public policies that established and reinforced patterns of residential
segregation. S ee KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION
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Supreme Court expanded the scope of due process during the interwar
period to rescue black victims of grossly unjust trials, but these
individual (rather than class-action) cases did almost nothing to
remedy the structural racism that pervaded the southern legal system
(pp. 117-35, 152-58). During the New Deal era, the justices did signal a
greater willingness to consider the state action dilemma in cases
involving the all-white primary in Texas and the failure of Missouri to
provide a substantively equal law school for a black applicant in the
Gaines litigation brought by the NAACP.38 The civil rights group
ensured that voting discrimination and substantive equality in public
education would remain on the judicial agenda during and after World
War II, the turning point in Klarman's story.
III.

THEWATERSHED

World War II serves as the watershed in Klarman's account of the
transformation of race relations in twentieth-century United States
history (pp. 173-96). Broader political and ideological trends directly
shaped the increased judicial activism of the Supreme Court, because
"[n]ot until World War II catalyzed fundamental shifts in U.S. racial
attitudes and practices did the justices begin transforming the
constitutional jurisprudence of race" (p. 152). The Second Great
Migration of black southerners to the urban North altered the calculus
of national politics and placed racial equality on the agenda of postwar
liberalism. Fighting a war against fascism inspired growing numbers of
African-American citizens to mobilize for democracy at home and
also encouraged many white Americans to reconsider ideologies of
white supremacy and black inferiority. Massive federal spending
programs, stretching from the New Deal through the Cold War,
launched an economic revolution in the South that underlaid long
term demographic and political changes. The Soviet Union publicized
southern lynchings and northern race riots as evidence of American
hypocrisy, creating a "Cold War imperative for racial change" (p. 183)
that Klarman presents as probably the most significant factor in
transforming elite opinion and civil rights jurisprudence. Franklin
Roosevelt and Harry Truman also completely reconfigured the
makeup of the conservative Court of the early New Deal period, and
the new justices began to move aggressively into areas of civil rights

OF THE UNITED STATES (1985); see also DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON,
AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993).
Klarman approaches this debate more from the perspective of constitutional theory, with the
observation that one's stance on the presence or absence of state action in many areas of
racial inequality is largely a product of personal political values. See pp. 138-39.
38. Pp. 100-16, 135-42, 146-52, 160-70; Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337
(1938).
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and civil liberties.39 Klarman observes that because of the rapid shift in
public opinion that resulted from the dynamics of World War II and
the Cold War rationale for black equality, "the justices seemed willing
to vindicate nearly any claim for progressive racial reform, even if
doing so required considerable legal creativity" (p. 173).
In Smith v. Allwright, eight of the justices invalidated the all-white
primary in Texas under an expansive interpretation of state-action
theory, in the process overruling a unanimous Supreme Court
precedent that had reached the opposite conclusion only nine years
earlier (pp. 197-204).40 Klarman argues that several justices
"subordinated their understanding of law to politics" (p. 204), and he
further asserts that "to focus on judicial turnover as the explanation
for Smith is to miss the fundamental importance of World War 11."41
This particular Court decision produced immediate and substantial
repercussions in southern politics, primarily in the major cities where
the percentage of black adults registered to vote increased
dramatically (pp. 236-53). Six years later, in response to the NAACP
stratagem of using the Gaines precedent to challenge the absence of
substantive equality in higher education, the Court "functionally
overruled Plessy" in a pair of cases from Texas and Oklahoma (p.
205). Sweatt v. Painter unanimously ordered the admission of a black
plaintiff to the University of Texas Law School, under the reasoning
that a segregated alternative provided by the state lacked the tangible
and intangible qualities necessary for an equal education.42 "Had
separate but equal always meant this," Klarman comments, "the South
could not have constructed a social system around it" (p. 208). On the
same day in 1950, the McLaurin ruling forbade the University of
Oklahoma from segregating a black graduate student within its
facilities.43 A majority of states in the border and upper South slowly
began to comply with the higher education decisions, but political
39. Klarman cites the role of political process theory in the expansion of constitutional
jurisprudence that accelerated in the 1940s, and he also contends that the emergence of the
Cold War rationale for racial egalitarianism offers a better explanation than the altered
makeup of the Supreme Court for the liberal opinions of the postwar era. See pp. 193-96; see
also Klarman, supra note 24.
40. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
41. P. 200. Lacking direct evidence from internal Court deliberations, Klarman
speculates that the justices "must have been tempted" to move closer to democracy at home
during a war fought under expanding that ideology abroad, which "probably influenced
judicial thinking about the white primary." Id. Klarman is probably correct in this
assessment, but some scholars may be unconvinced by the either-or need to disaggregate the
effect of judicial turnover from the transformative impact of the war, an impulse driven
more by the desire to support a specific theory of the development of constitutional law than
to portray the multiplicity of causal factors behind most historical events.
42. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
43. McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
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resistance effectively nullified the rulings in the Deep South, a
subregion that also continued to oppress black voters in extralegal
defiance of Smith (pp. 204- 11, 253-61). Klarman concludes that the
voting rights and higher education cases are "best explained in terms
of social and political change," including not only the decisionmaking
process of the justices but also the evolution of white racial attitudes in
the more moderate areas of the urban and upper South where
enforcement of these rulings actually happened (p. 209).
As Klarman's primary causal explanation for constitutional
jurisprudence, "public opinion" is an undoubtedly important but also
fairly elastic framework of analysis. Consider the Supreme Court's
precedent-breaking ruling in Shelley v. Kraemer, which outlawed
judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants as a violation of
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (pp. 21217).44 For several decades, the federal courts repeatedly had found
racial covenants to be constitutional as a form of private
discrimination beyond the scope of state action. "Rarely have the
justices changed their minds about an issue so swiftly and
unanimously," Klarman observes, "but then, rarely has public opinion
on any issue changed as rapidly as public opinion on race did in the
postwar years" (p. 215). But what if Shelley had gone the other way, or
more likely, if the Court had continued to decline to review challenges
to the well-established precedent? Ample evidence exists from the
postwar period to demonstrate that, as Klarman also observes, "most
northern whites opposed integrating their own neighborhoods,
[although] they increasingly favored suppressing the more extreme
aspects of southern Jim Crow" (p. 193). In other words, the same
climate-of-public-opinion thesis employed to explain Shelley could just
as easily have explained the opposite result. At any rate, the Supreme
Court did not extend the state-action theory in Shelley to cover other
public policies that entrenched residential segregation in America's
metropolitan regions during the postwar decades, including the
racially discriminatory effects of municipal zoning and planning
policies combined with federal mortgage programs, urban renewal,
and highway construction.45 Klarman's flexible model attributes this to
judicial disinclination to "contravene dominant public opinion on
housing segregation" (p. 264), but it is also crucial to understand a
point not emphasized in this book: that in the metropolitan regions,
these state-sponsored patterns of residential segregation would shape

44. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).

45. Pp. 261-74; see also JACKSON, supra note 37.
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the responses of southern (and eventually northern) whites to the
school desegregation mandate set forth in Brown.46
Klarman's account of the internal deliberations among the justices
as they contemplated the Brown decision is fascinating. More than
one-third of the states still mandated school segregation in the early
1950s, and the five cases combined into Brown included two from the
rural South, two from cities in the border region, and one from the
District of Columbia (pp. 292-312). Evidence from the private papers
of several justices reveals that a majority "were deeply conflicted"
over the case, which the swing faction viewed as a conflict between
constitutional law and personal political values (p. 293). Klarman
believes that the ruling could have gone either way, but in the end the
Court achieved unanimity in the resolution to overturn Plessy,
following Chief Justice Earl Warren's argument that "we must act but
we should do it in a tolerant way" (p. 302). Although Brown's
repudiation of statutory school segregation moved the Supreme Court
into a leading role in the movement for racial equality, especially
compared to the inaction of the political branches of the federal
government, Klarman fits the decision into his public opinion
framework by noting that white sentiment nationwide roughly divided
in half. "Brown is not an example of the Court's resistance to
majoritarian sentiment," he concludes, "but rather of its conversion of
an emerging national consensus into a constitutional command" (p.
310). The 1955 implementation order in Brown II provides support for
his thesis that the decision did not move very far beyond national
public opinion, as the Supreme Court "chose vagueness and
gradualism" instead of the NAACP's request for immediate
compliance with firm guidelines (p. 313). The justices worried that an
unenforceable order would weaken the public authority of the
Supreme Court, and the policy of gradualism also mirrored the
preferences of white southern moderates and many northern liberals.
Decentralized desegregation enforcement on a timetable of "all
deliberate speed" appeared to be a pragmatic compromise between
constitutional rights and political realities (pp. 312-20).
Brown II invites historians to engage in a different version of
Klarman's counterfactual hypothesis that the racial liberalization
unleashed by World War II would have undermined Jim Crow even
without the intervention of the Supreme Court.47 Students of the civil
46. I have argued elsewhere that constitutional law (and political discourse) established
a false dichotomy between de jure and de facto segregation during the post-1945 era, in the
interlinked areas of housing and education, because a history of state-sponsored policies of
residential segregation shaped spatial landscapes and "neighborhood schools" assignment
plans in the metropolitan regions of the South and the North. See MATIHEW D. LASSITER,
THE SILENT MAJORITY: SUBURBAN POLITICS IN THE SUNBELT SOUTH (2005).
47. See pp. 344-442; see also Klarman, supra notes 4-5.

1416

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 103:1401

rights movement have highlighted the period of relative calm that
followed the initial Brown ruling, especially in the residentially
segregated metropolitan areas and in the states of the upper and outer
South that contained smaller percentages of black residents.48 Massive
resistance to school desegregation fully emerged as a regional political
movement only in the aftermath of Brown II, and some scholars have
concluded that the lesson of "all deliberate speed" is that court
ordered desegregation must be implemented rapidly and
comprehensively instead of incrementally to be successful.49 Klarman
observes that the implementation decree "invited delay by recalcitrant
school boards and district judges and provided inadequate political
cover for those who were willing to comply in good faith" (p. 317). But
then he asks rhetorically if the Court's "miscalculation matter[ed]
much? Probably not" (p. 320). Moving beyond the speculative,
Klarman demonstrates that the Brown II warning that popular
opposition would not be permitted to delay the enforcement of
constitutional law represented little more than a proforma declaration
that the justices themselves "did not take seriously" (p. 318).
Historians have tended to critique the gradualist and tokenist
desegregation plans supported by white southern moderates as
obvious subterfuges that subverted the original spirit of Brown, but
Klarman provides a convincing reminder that the Supreme Court
declined to review minimalist formulas approved by district judges and
explicitly affirmed allegedly race-neutral pupil placement laws
designed to maintain as much segregation as possible by vesting
discretion in local officials (pp. 321-43).
During the first decade after Brown, the amount of school
desegregation accomplished under the "all deliberate speed" regime
turned out to be extremely limited. The Supreme Court decision did
accelerate desegregation in the border states, although "freedom-of
choice" assignment plans and "neighborhood schools" policies that
reflected residential segregation combined to keep most black
students in single-race schools (pp. 344-48). In the eleven states that
formed the heart of the South, Brown triggered a political showdown
between white moderates in the metropolitan regions who supported
legal compliance and uncompromising segregationists from the rural
countryside who demanded massive resistance. Legislatures in the
Deep South, along with their counterparts in Virginia and Arkansas,
enacted massive resistance programs that revolved around the
·

48. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. CHAFE, CIVILITIES AND CIVIL RIGHTS: GREENSBORO,
NORTH CAROLINA, AND THE BLACK STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM (1980).
49. The most forceful argument that successful court-ordered desegregation depends
upon sweeping change instead of incrementalism can be found in JENNIFER L.
HOCHSCHILD, THE NEW AMERICAN DILEMMA: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION (1984).
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abandonment of public education in response to any degree of court
ordered desegregation. President Eisenhower maintained a position of
neutrality on Brown until 1957, when mob violence and blatant
political nullification of a judicial mandate forced him to send federal
troops to escort black students to a white school in Little Rock.
Moderate leaders in the cities and suburbs tended to favor minimal
desegregation rather than outright defiance, but the systematic
malapportionment of state legislatures empowered rural counties over
metropolitan regions, and public opinion did not shift markedly
toward compliance until after segregationist politicians closed public
schools in Virginia and Arkansas.50 Except for Cooper v. Aaron, which
refused to tolerate violence as a rationale for postponement in Little
Rock, the Supreme Court stayed above the school desegregation fray
during the decade after Brown (pp. 324-34).51 Moderation ultimately
replaced massive resistance across the region, but under policies of
gradualism and tokenism only one percent of southern black students
attended desegregated schools in 1964 (p. 362). Klarman observes that
"[t]he federal judiciary, acting without any congressional or much
presidential backing, had proved powerless to accomplish more" (pp.
362-63).
IV.

FEDERAL COURTS AND

SOCIAL CHA NGE

The final chapter of From Jim Crow to Civil Rights, nearly one
hundred pages in length, provides a detailed narrative of Klarman's
backlash thesis that Brown played a significant role in the racial
transformation of the South only through an indirect and ironic causal
chain that ultimately led to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (pp. 344-442).
If Brown accomplished only a limited amount of actual desegregation
during its first decade, the ruling played a direct role in the
radicalization of southern politics by making race the dominant theme
for a generation, especially in the most resistant Deep South states
targeted by the direct-action wing of the civil rights movement.
Klarman offers a two-part argument about the relationship between
the Supreme Court and the civil rights movement: "Brown was less
directly responsible than is commonly supposed for the direct-action
protests of the 1960s and more responsible for ensuring that those

50. Pp. 385-421. If the Supreme Court had jettisoned the "political questions" doctrine
and invalidated legislative malapportionment before Brown, instead of waiting until the
reapportionment cases of the early 1960s, moderates would have enjoyed a much stronger
position vis-a-vis massive resisters in southern politics, and "massive resistance might have
played out rather differently." P. 415. For an extended version of this thesis, see LASSITER,
supra note 46.
51. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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demonstrations were brutally suppressed by southern law enforcement
officers" (p. 364). He concedes almost no ground to the scholars52 who
have previously criticized the backlash thesis for failing to connect the
dots between Brown and civil rights protests such as the Montgomery
bus boycott. Instead Klarman argues that the evidence for drawing
such a direct connection is weak and inconclusive, and at any rate
"[d]eep background forces set the stage for mass racial protest. Brown
was not the spark that ignited it" (p. 377). Brown mattered most,
according to Klarman's formula, in the political arena of the Deep
South, where the backlash against the Supreme Court empowered
racial demagogues who were willing to employ violence against black
demonstrators, even after it became apparent that televised
confrontations played directly into the tactical goals of the civil rights
movement.53
The grassroots protests of civil rights activists forced a reluctant
federal government to dismantle the legal underpinnings of Jim Crow.
Klarman concludes that the moral example of the nonviolent civil
rights movement, more than the abstract guarantees of racial
nondiscrimination announced by Brown, convinced most white
Americans to accept the principle of legal equality. The violent
crackdowns against civil rights marchers in Birmingham (1963) and
Selma (1965), which played out on the television news programs,
"transformed racial opinion in the North" (p. 364) and "ultimately
rallied national opinion behind the enforcement of Brown and the
enactment of civil rights legislation" (p. 385). Congress passed the
Civil Rights Act of 1 964, which outlawed segregation in public
accommodations, granted the Justice Department authority to file
school desegregation lawsuits against local jurisdictions, and
authorized the termination of federal funds for noncompliant
districts.54 One year later, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of
1965, which provided for federal enforcement of the Fifteenth
Amendment and helped to produce a sea change in southern politics.55
Within a decade, southern states led the nation in the number of black
office holders, and the region contained a higher percentage of black
students attending desegregated public schools than any other part of

52. See, e.g., Garrow, supra note 6.
53. Klarman asks: "Would the same violence have confronted civil rights demonstrators
without Brown?" He answers that "[o]ne cannot know for certain. . . . How southern whites
in this counterfactual universe would have responded if and when black street
demonstrations erupted is impossible to tell." P. 442. At some point, readers may begin to
wonder if the combination of speculative conclusions and counterfactual scenarios is subject
to the law of diminishing returns.
54. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a)-(e)(5) (2000).
55. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000).
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the country.56 Klarman concludes that "[t]he 1964 Civil Rights Act, not
was plainly the proximate cause of most school desegregation
in the South" (p. 363). When the Supreme Court returned to
desegregation jurisprudence in the mid-1960s, the justices "were
following, not leading, national opinion. The civil rights movement
had overtaken the school desegregation process, and the political
branches of the national government were now playing the vanguard
role" (p. 343).
The book ends here but the story does not. The most glaring, and
most puzzling, omission in From Jim Crow to Civil Rights is its failure
to examine in almost any depth the actual impact of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, especially vis-a-vis the substantial involvement of the
judicial branch in the process of school desegregation during the
second decade after Brown.51 Executive branch enforcement of the
Civil Rights Act originally targeted the noncompliant rural districts
that maintained complete segregation, and federal policy initially
required only that localities implement the minimalist "freedom-of
choice" formulas already approved by the courts. The Johnson
administration began to demand more substantive integration
procedures in the late 1960s, but executive branch oversight played a
relatively minor role in the population centers of the urban South,
where most districts instead operated under judicial supervision
because of ongoing NAACP litigation.58 Then the Supreme Court
transformed desegregation case law in Green v. New Kent County,
which dismantled the "all deliberate speed" regime and charged
school districts with "the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might
be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial
discrimination would be eliminated root and branch."59 Under these
expansive guidelines, rooted in the soaring text if not the original
intent of Brown, the NAACP convinced several district courts to
order busing to overcome state-sponsored patterns of residential
Brown,

56. See QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT,
1965-1990 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994); see also GARY ORFIELD &
FRANKLIN MONFORT, NAT'L SCH. B os Assoc., STATUS OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION:
THE NEXT GENERATION (1992).
.

57. Klarman dedicates only a few pages to the process of school desegregation after
1964. Pp. 341-43, 362-63. For a more balanced account of the role of executive branch
agencies and federal courts in the enforcement of Brown between the mid-1960s and the
mid-1970s, see JAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS
MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY (2001).
58. See GARY ORFIELD, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTHERN EDUCATION: THE
SCHOOLS AND THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (1969); see also J. HARVIE WILKINSON III,
FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION, 1954-1978
(1979).
59. 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968).
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segregation in urban schools, a novel and far-reaching extension of
state-action doctrine. District Judge James B. McMillan pioneered the
two-way busing of black and white students to integrate
"neighborhood schools" in a landmark 1969 decision that galvanized
enormous white resistance but was ultimately affirmed by the
Supreme Court in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg.(J()
This combination of NAACP litigation and federal court rulings not the direct consequences of the Civil Rights Act and certainly not a
monolithic expression of "northern public opinion" - played the
crucial role in producing the dramatic surge in school desegregation
that transformed southern public education in the early 1970s.61 The
ratio of southern black students attending desegregated schools
increased to about one-sixth in 1967 and to one-third in 1969 before
skyrocketing to more than three-fourths by 1973 (although only about
two-thirds of this group attended majority-white schools).62 Executive
branch enforcement deserves a substantial portion of the credit for the
acceleration of desegregation during the half-decade after the 1964
Civil Rights Act, but only the emergence of court-ordered busing can
explain the mushroom effect that followed the Supreme Court's
approval of the expansive remedy in Swann. In fact, opponents of
busing often cited the text of the Civil Rights Act, in which Congress
(at the insistence of northern members) specified that "nothing herein
shall empower any official or court of the United States to issue any
order seeking to achieve a racial balance in any school by requiring
the transportation of pupils or students from one school to another or
one school district to another. "63 The escalation of southern school
desegregation between 1969 and 1973 also occurred despite the Nixon
White House's direct orders to executive branch enforcement officials
to avoid busing and to hold integration to the minimum required by

60. 300 F. Supp. 1358 (1969); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1
(1971). For the broader story behind the political backlash against court-ordered busing,
including the Charlotte litigation, see LASSITER, supra note 46.
61. Contrary to the political mythology that court-ordered busing failed completely as
public policy, comprehensive plans produced substantial integration in a number of urban
school systems in the South during the early 1970s. The key variable for successful
implementation involved the prior consolidation of city school systems with surrounding
counties, which reduced the problem of "white flight" to the suburbs through the
establishment of countywide districts and allowed busing programs to overcome
metropolitan patterns of residential segregation. See GARY ORFIELD & FRANKLIN
MONFORT, NAT'L SCH. B os. Assoc., RACIAL CHANGE AND DESEGREGATION IN LARGE
SCHOOL DISTRICTS (1988).
62. P. 363. The figures Klarman cites are somewhat inflated because they include black
students in predominantly black schools with only a few white students, but the general
trajectory of acceleration is accurate. For comparison, nineteen percent of southern black
students attended majority-white schools in 1968, and forty-five percent did by 1972. See
ORFIELD & MONFORT, supra note 56, at 14.
63. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a)-(e)(5) (2000).
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law.64 In the face of concerted political backlash, the federal judges
who advanced the busing jurisprudence grounded their authority
primarily in the long shadow of Brown's pronouncement of the
constitutional principle that "[s)eparate educational facilities are
inherently unequal," combined with an unprecedented willingness to
investigate the de jure roots of allegedly de facto segregation resulting
from housing patterns and neighborhood schools.65
The pivotal role of court-ordered busing in many southern cities
challenges Klarman's model of judicial minimalism and requires
revision - but not abandonment - of his thesis that Supreme Court
decisions never venture far beyond mainstream public opinion. In
1973, in Keyes v. Denver, the Court found a large city outside of the
South guilty of de jure methods of racial discrimination in the
maintenance of segregated neighborhood schools, and the national
backlash against busing intensified as civil rights jurisprudence moved
northward and westward.66 A year later, in Milliken v. Bradley, the
justices overturned a district court plan to consolidate the city and
suburban school districts of metropolitan Detroit in order to
implement comprehensive two-way busing throughout the region.67
The specter of public opinion, and the inherent politicization of
constitutional law, plainly shaped the outcome of Milliken, not least
because Richard Nixon had recently appointed four of the justices in
the five-member majority that delivered the NAACP's first landmark
defeat in school desegregation case law.68 While Swann presents a
difficult case, Milliken fits more smoothly into Klarman's analytical
framework, which offers little comfort to those who believe that the
Supreme Court should act as an engine of social change. In the
conclusion, he observes that "the justices reflect dominant public
opinion too much for them to protect truly oppressed groups" (p. 449).
Instead, the "courts are likely to protect only those minorities that are
favorably regarded by majority opinion. . . . [N)ot a single Court
decision involving race clearly contravened national public opinion"
during the era between Plessy and Brown (p. 450).

64. See GARY ORFIELD, MUST WE Bus? SEGREGATION AND NATIONAL POLICY

(1978).
65. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
66. 413 U.S. 189 (1973); see also ORFIELD, supra note 64.
67. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
68. Klarman does not mention Keyes or Milliken, and the book contains only a fleeting
reference to Swann. Pp. 341-42. Although the book is focused primarily on the Jim Crow
regime in the South, only in the final two chapters about Brown does the northern context
disappear altogether, except for the monolithic role played by northern public opinion in
establishing the civil rights legislation of the rnid-1960s.
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At the beginning of the book, Klarman assures readers that the
narrative to follow "makes no claim about how judges should decide
cases. This is not a work of normative constitutional theory" (p. 5).
Perhaps this caveat is true, but the evidence and the arguments
marshaled throughout this examination of seventy years of American
history consistently point in the same direction: legislative actions
matter far more than federal court decisions; the ability of judges to
implement social change is quite limited; long-term historical
processes shape the evolution of constitutional law far more than vice
versa. Near the end, Klarman asks "[w]hat lessons shall we draw from
this study about the consequences of Court rulings?" (p. 454). Citing
the persistent discrimination against blacks through allegedly color
blind laws and public policies, he points out that "[c]onstitutional
interpretation that is limited to form and is unwilling to delve into
substance is vulnerable to nullification by determined resistance" (p.
457). Instead of providing positive guarantees of substantive equality,
"constitutional rights are generally limited to negative constraints on
government" (p. 461) In broader perspective, Klarman warns that
more recent judicial activism in areas such as abortion and gay rights,
where public opinion is deeply divided and constitutional law is
unclear, has galvanized fierce political backlashes reminiscent of the
rise of massive resistance to Brown (p. 464-66). But since backlashes
against the expansion of constitutional rights can also generate
counter-backlashes, as well as embolden rights-based movements to
push for legislative as well as judicial protection, history remains an
unpredictable guide to the future. Still, Klarman cautions that social
movements miscalculate when they elevate litigation over alternative
strategies, including direct-action protests and legislative victories,
because of the "limited capacity of lawsuits alone to produce social
change" (p. 467). "Court decisions do matter," Klarman concludes in
this formidable and controversial book, "[b]ut they cannot
fundamentally transform a nation" (p. 468).
.

